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PROTECTING DONOR PRIVACY IN AIDS RELATED BLOOD
BANK LITIGATION-Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Center, 117 Wash.
2d 772, 819 P.2d 370 (1991).
Ann Marie LoGerfo
Abstrac" One controversial issue in blood bank AIDS litigation is whether courts
should permit infected plaintiffs to conduct discovery of information about the blood
donor who contributed the contaminated blood. Many courts have taken a reasonable
middle ground by allowing limited discovery of a blood donor provided that the donor's
identity remains confidential. In a recent case, the Washington Supreme Court provided
no such limitation on blood donor discovery. This Note argues that the court's decision
infringes on the significant privacy interests of the blood donor and violates the public's
interest in an adequate blood supply while providing little or no benefit to the plaintiff.

The emergence of the deadly disease AIDS1 has posed enormous
political and social challenges. One of these is the flood of litigation
involving both AIDS and HIV infection. Since its discovery in 1981,
there have been over one thousand cases connected with AIDS or
HIV.2 Claims against blood banks for supplying blood contaminated
with the AIDS virus have been a fertile area of litigation. Plaintiffs in
these suits often seek discovery of the identity of the donor who provided the contaminated blood.
The Washington Supreme Court has decided two cases involving
blood donor discovery. In each case the court upheld the trial court's
discovery order, but failed to establish any parameters for allowable
donor discovery. In Howell v. Spokane & InlandEmpire Blood Bank,3
the court held that a trial court order allowing limited discovery of a
blood donor, with no disclosure of the donor's identity, was not an
abuse of discretion. In Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Center,4 the court
upheld a trial court order compelling disclosure of the donor's name,
address, phone number and social security number. Thus, there are
no limits on a Washington trial court's discretion to either allow or
prohibit disclosure of the blood donor's identity.
This Note argues that the Doe court should have explicitly established a rule that limits discovery to the approach in Howell. The Doe
1. AIDS is an acronym for acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, a fatal disease resulting
from infection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Centers for Disease Control,
AIDS and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United Stater 1988 Update, 38
MoaBDrl

& MORTALrrY WEEKLY REP. No.

S-4 1 (1989).

2. David Margolick, LegalSystem IsAssailed on AIDS Crisis,N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 19, 1992, § 1,
at 16.
3. 117 Wash. 2d 619, 818 P.2d 1056 (1991).
4. 117 Wash. 2d 772, 819 P.2d 370 (1991).
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court should have held that blood bank litigants may only conduct

limited discovery of a donor, with complete protection for the donor's
identity. Confidentiality is essential both to protect the individual
blood donor's privacy and to ensure that the general public remains
willing to donate blood. This Note proposes a statute directed at
blood donor discovery that would prohibit disclosure of the donor's
identity. Such a statute would augment an 5existing statute that provides limited confidentiality for HIV testing.
I. BLOOD DONOR DISCOVERY IN BLOOD BANK
LITIGATION
A.

A History of Blood Bank Litigation

The infected blood problem initially arose because blood banks were
incapable of screening out HIV-positive blood. Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) was first identified in 1981.6 No adequate test for the presence of HIV was available until the spring of
1985. 7 Before 1985, blood banks screened out HIV-infected blood by
requesting donors at high-risk' for HIV infection to self-screen and by
questioning potential donors about possible symptoms of HIV infection. 9 Some blood banks also directly questioned donors regarding
high-risk practices."0 However, this type of screening did not ensure a
pure blood supply.1 1 Blood transfusions with infected blood became a
5. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.105 (West Supp. 1992).

6. Center for Disease Control, Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United
States, 1981-1990, 265 JAMA 3226 (1991).

7. Brian Hjelle & Michael Busch, Direct Methods for Detectioi of HIV-1 Infection, 113
975, 975 (1989). Testing is now done by

ARCHIVES OF PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MED.

using a test called the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA or EIA). This test detects
antibodies to the HIV-I virus, which is the cause of AIDS. If the ELISA test is positive, a
confirmatory test is used, usually the Western Blot test. J. Sanford Schwartz et al., Human

Immunodeficiency Virus Test Evaluation, Performance and Use, 259 JAMA 2574, 2574-75
(1988).
8. High-risk activities are intraveneous drug use, homosexual activity, and blood transfusions.
Sexual relations with anyone who is in the high-risk category is also a high-risk activity.
Memorandum from the Director, Office of Biologics, National Center for Drugs and Biologics,
to All Establishments Collecting Human Blood for Transfusion (Mar. 21, 1983).
9. Id.
10. See, eg., Boutte v. Blood Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 124 (W.D. La. 1989); Belle Bonfils
Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court of Denver, 763 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Colo. 1988).
11. One reason that questioning of donors was not effective in screening for HIV is the long
lag time between HIV infection and the development of symptoms of AIDS. One researcher
estimates that only 8% of those infected with HIV develop AIDS within three years. Seventyfive percent do so after 5.2 years and 50% after 6.7 years. Stephen W. Lagakos & Victor De

Gruttola, The Conditional Latency Distribution of AIDS for Persons Infected by Blood
Transfusion, 2 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 84, 85 (1989). Additionally,
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major cause of HIV infection.12 Although the rate of HIV infection
due to blood transfusion has significantly declined, 13 blood banks continue to face AIDS-related litigation as recipients of previous transfusions discover they are HIV-positive.
B.

The Discovery Controversy
Most states, including Washington,14 have statutes eliminating

strict liability and warranty claims against blood banks. 5 Plaintiffs
must prove negligence on the part of the blood banks to recover damages. In order to establish negligence, plaintiffs generally seek discovery of information regarding the donor screening process.
These discovery requests arise in two types of situations. First,
HIV-infected plaintiffs may need to prove that they became infected

through a transfusion with contaminated blood.

6

In this situation,

plaintiffs need to question all possible sources of the blood used in the
transfusion to determine whether any of the donors are HIV positive.17 This has been referred to as a multiple donor situation." The
second discovery situation is the single donor case. In this instance,
the blood bank admits that the plaintiff received HIV-infected blood

from a specific donor, so causation is not an issue.19 Plaintiffs only
need to prove that the blood bank was negligent in allowing the HIVdonors may not be completely honest about such personal matters as intraveneous drug use and
homosexuality.
12. It is estimated that 70% of those with hemophilia A and 35% of those with hemophilia B
are HIV seropositive. Rafael Ortiz & Thomas Aaberg, Human Immunodeficiency Virus Disease
Epidemiology and Nosocomial Infection (Perspectives), 112 AM. J. OPHTHALMOLOGY 335, 337
(1991).
13. Report of the Workgroup on Blood and Blood Products, Background andProgressSince
Cool/ont, 103 PUB. HEALTH REP. 58 (Supp. 1988).
14. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.120 (West Supp. 1992):
The procurement, processing, storage, distribution, administration, or use of whole blood,
plasma, blood products and blood derivatives for the purpose of injecting or transfusing the
same... into the human body is... a servie ... and is declared not to be covered by any
implied warranty ... and no civil liability shall be incurred as a result of any such acts,
except in the case of willful or negligent conduct ....
15. Most states have statutes similar to Washington which eliminate strict liability and
warranty claims against blood banks. Lawrence 0. Gostin, The AIDS Litigation Project: A
NationalReview of Court and Human Rights Commission Decisions,PartL" The Social Impact of
AIDS, 263 JAMA 1961, 1962 (1990).
16. Peter B. Kunin, Note, Transfusion-RelatedAIDS Litigation: PermittingLimited Discovery
From Blood Donors in Single Donor Cases, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 927, 928 (1991).
17. Id.; see, eg., Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987).
18. Kunin, supra note 16, at 928. The multiple donor situation presents a number of issues
that are beyond the scope of this Note.
19. Id.
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infected donor to give blood.2 0 Accordingly, plaintiffs want information regarding the screening of blood donors.2 1 Detailed information
about the verbal and written screening process is especially important
to the plaintiff's case because there was no testing of blood for HIV
before 1985.22
To comply with discovery requests, blood banks are willing to supply the plaintiffs with donor records.2 3 These records include information such as the donor's donor card and questionnaires the donor may
have filled out.24 To protect the donor's identity, the blood banks
remove the donor's name from the documents.2 5 This allows plaintiffs
to receive information about the donor and the screening process without disclosure of the donor's identity. While blood banks are willing
to provide plaintiffs with their records, they are uniformly opposed to
disclosing the identity of the blood donor.26 Blood banks claim that if
courts allow discovery of donor identities, the fear of public disclosure
will deter potential volunteers from donating.2 7
Plaintiffs contend that they must directly question the donor to
bring a successful negligence action against a blood bank.28 The questions may refer to the donor's past medical history,29 how the donor
infected with AIDS,3" and details regarding
believes he or she became
31
process.
the screening
Blood banks have used three approaches in attempting to bar discovery of donors. 32 First, blood banks have asserted that the patientphysician privilege bars discovery of information that blood bank
workers obtain during the blood donation.3 3 Second, blood banks
20. Id.
21. Id. at 928-29.
22. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360, 361 (E.D. Mich. 1990);
Boutte v. Blood Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 123 (W.D. La. 1989); Doe v. American Red Cross
Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 647 (D.S.C. 1989).
24. See, ag., Coleman, 130 F.R.D. at 361; Boutte, 127 F.R.D. at 123; Doe, 125 F.R.D. at 647.
25. See, eg., Coleman, 130 F.R.D. at 361; Boutte, 127 F.R.D. at 123; Doe, 125 F.R.D. at 649.
26. Richard C. Bollow & Daryl J. Lapp, Protecting the Confidentiality of Blood Donors'
Identities in AIDS Litigation, 37 DRAKE L. REv. 343, 345 (1987-8 8).
27. Id.
28. See, ag., Coleman, 130 F.R.D. at 361; Doe, 125 F.R.D. at 649; Mason v. Regional
Medical Ctr., 121 F.R.D. 300, 301 (W.D. Ky. 1988).
29. See, e.g., Doe, 125 F.R.D. at 651.
30. Id.
31. See, eg., Coleman, 130 F.R.D. at 361; Boutte v. Blood Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 125
(W.D. La. 1989).
32. Bollow & Lapp, supra note 26, at 345.
33. See, eg., Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court of Denver, 763 P.2d 1003,
1009 (Colo. 1988).
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have claimed that disclosure would violate the blood donor's right of
privacy under both the United States Constitution 34 and relevant state
constitutions.3 5 Third, blood banks have sought protective orders
under state discovery rules.36
Claims that assert the statutory physician-patient privilege have not
been successful.37 In most states, the privilege is limited to communications between patient and physician for purposes of treatment.38

Information donors reveal while giving blood is generally not privileged under state statutes because
the donor is not a patient and is not
39
treatment.
medical
receiving
The constitutional right to privacy argument has also received little
acceptance.' Courts have rejected this argument under three lines of
reasoning. Some courts have held that the constitutional right to privacy does not extend to disclosure of personal information.41 Other
courts have found that there is a constitutional privacy right that
applies to disclosure of personal information, but discovery of the
blood donor would not violate that right.4 2 Still other courts have
specifically stated that they would not reach the constitutional analysis
because the discovery rules offer adequate protection for blood
donors.43
Rather than holding that statutory privilege or the Constitution
absolutely bars blood donor discovery, virtually all courts have found
that the most appropriate method for regulating donor discovery is
34. The United States Supreme Court identifies two kinds of privacy: "One is the individual's
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
Blood donor discovery arguably falls under the first interest.
35. See, eg., Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 650 (D.S.C. 1989).
36. See, eg., Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360, 361 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
37. See, eg., Snyder v. Meklian, 593 A.2d 318, 323 (N.J. 1991); Belle Bonfils, 763 P.2d at
1009. But see Krygier v. Airweld, Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (holding that the
privilege does apply).
38. See, eg., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(4) (West Supp. 1992) (protects a physician
from disclosing, without patient's consent, "any information acquired in attending such patient,
which was necessary to enable him or her to prescribe or act for the patient").
39. See, eg., Snyder, 593 A.2d at 323; Belle Bonfis, 763 P.2d at 1009.
40. See, eg., Mason v. Regional Medical Ctr., 121 F.R.D. 300, 303 (W.D. Ky. 1988).
41. See, eg., id. (blood donor's constitutional claim for privacy is beyond the recognized
scope of the right to privacy).
42. See, eg., Borzillieri v. American Nat'l Red Cross, No. CIV-89-1296C, 1991 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 15757, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1991); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734
S.W.2d 675, 679 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
43. See, eg., Boutte v. Blood Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 125 (W.D. La. 1989); Doe v.
American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 650 (D.S.C. 1989).
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through state or federal discovery rules.' In blood bank litigation,
courts have used the discovery rules to bar donor discovery completely,45 to allow limited discovery without disclosure of identifying
information,4 6 and to compel blood banks to disclose the identity of
the blood donor. 7
C. ProtectingConfidentiality Under the Discovery Rule
State and federal discovery rules provide an established mechanism
for protecting the identities of blood donors. While the rules of dis-

covery allow plaintiffs to obtain information about blood donors, these
rules could also provide the courts with the means for protecting
donors' privacy.
The general policy favoring broad discovery reflects the preference
that litigation be based on all relevant facts and not on surprise.4 8 The
discovery rule in Washington, Civil Rule 26 (CR 26), is consistent
with this general policy.4 9 Under CR 26, if a relevant matter is not
privileged, it is generally discoverable.5 0 This policy favoring broad
discovery is tempered, however, by CR 26(c),5 1 which allows the court
to issue protective orders to guard against overly burdensome discovery requests.5 2 The trial court in Howell used CR 26(c) to fashion a
discovery order protecting the blood donor's privacy.5 3 In addition, a
44. See, ag., Sampson v. American Nat'l Red Cross, No. CA3-90-2876-T, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17285, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 1991); Boutte, 127 F.R.D. at 125; Doe, 125 F.R.D. at
650.
45. See, eg., Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360, 363 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
46. See, eg., Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court of Denver, 763 P.2d 1003,
1014 (Colo. 1988).
47. See, eg., Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675, 680 (rex. Ct. App.
1987).
48. See 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2007 (1970).
49. WASH. CR 26 states that a party "may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action."
50. WASH. CR 26.
51. The text of WASH. CR 26(c) provides for protective orders:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good
cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to
a deposition, the court in the county where the deposition is to be taken may make any order
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression or undue burden or expense ....
52. "Under Rules 26(c), and 30(d) the [trial] court exercises a broad discretion to manage the
discovery process in a fashion that will implement the philosophy of full disclosure of relevant
information and at the same time afford the participants maximum protection against harmful
side effects." 4 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.67 (2d ed. 1989).
53. Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 117 Wash. 2d 619, 629, 818 P.2d 1056,
1061 (1991).
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number of courts in jurisdictions outside Washington have used the
equivalent state or federal discovery rule to protect the confidentiality
of blood donors. 4 To determine the necessity of a protective order,
the trial court must weigh the competing interests of the parties."
Although a trial court's discovery order will not be overturned absent
a showing of abuse of discretion,56 in reviewing the order, the higher
court engages in its own balancing of the competing interests
involved. 57
D. Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Center
In Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Center,5 8 the Washington Supreme
Court reviewed a discovery order compelling disclosure of identifying
information about a blood donor.5 9 The case began when Donor X
donated blood at the Puget Sound Blood Center.' At the time of the
donation, there was no blood test for HIV.6 1 The plaintiff received a
transfusion in 1984 with Donor X's blood.62 About one year later,
Donor X again donated blood at the blood center, and a blood sample
from Donor X tested positive for HIV under the ELISA test.6 3 The
blood center determined that during the 1984 blood transfusion, the
plaintiff had received the blood earlier supplied by Donor X. 4 Two
years later, the blood bank notified the plaintiff of the potential for
HIV infection.65
The plaintiff brought a suit against the blood bank for negligent
screening. The plaintiff sought to compel the blood bank to reveal the
54. See, eg., Snyder v. Mekhjian, 593 A.2d 318, 320 (NJ. 1991) (veiled deposition or written
interrogatories); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court of Denver, 763 P.2d 1003,
1013-14 (Colo. 1988) (discovery of donor only by deposition upon written question channelled
through the court clerk).
55. Rlhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98 Wash. 2d 226, 256, 654 P.2d 673, 690 (1982) (in
determining whether a protective order is needed, the court weighs the respective interests of the
parties).
56. State ex rel Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wash. 2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775, 784 (1971) (Where the
order of the trial court is a matter of discretion, it will not be disturbed on review except on a
clear showing of abuse of discretion.).
57. Id (Whether there has been an abuse of discretion "depends upon the comparative and
compelling public or private interests of those affected by the order or decision and the
comparative weight of the reasons for and against the decision one way or the other.").
58. 117 Wash. 2d 772, 819 P.2d 370 (1991).
59. Id. at 776-77, 819 P.2d at 372.
60. Id. at 775, 819 P.2d at 372.
61. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
62. Doe, 117 Wash. 2d at 775, 819 P.2d at 372.

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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donor's identity in order to discover more information about the
screening process." The trial court ordered the Puget Sound Blood
Center to disclose to the plaintiff the name, address, telephone number
and social security number of the blood donor.67 The blood bank
appealed the order.
In determining whether the discovery order was within the trial
court's discretion, the Washington Supreme Court stated that it must
identify and weigh the comparative interests of the plaintiff, the
defendant, and the donor.6 8 However, the court did not fully address
the claims of the blood bank 6 9 and did not consider the privacy interests of the blood donor7' because of inadequacies with the factual record and briefs presented.
The court began its analysis of the parties' competing interests with
an examination of the plaintiff's interests in discovery. The court
found two considerations supporting the plaintiff's discovery request.
First, the court noted that the Washington State Constitution guaranteed access to the court system.7 1 Second, CR 26 provided the plaintiff
with a right to broad discovery.72 The court stated that the plaintiff's
right of access to the courts and right to discovery "must be accorded
a high priority. '73 The court also noted that the plaintiff demonstrated a need for discovery based on the facts of the case.7 4
The court declined consideration of the donor's privacy interests,
however, due to inadequacies in the briefs submitted. 75 The parties
briefed the privacy interests of a living donor because the donor was
still alive at the time of the discovery order. 6 The court, however,
refused to consider the interests of a living donor, as the donor had
since died.7 7 Furthermore, because the parties did not brief the inter66. Id.
67. Id. at 776, 819 P.2d at 372. At the time of the discovery order, Donor X was still alive.
Id. at 783, 819 P.2d at 376. However, by the time the Supreme Court reviewed the case, Donor
X had died. Id.
68. Id at 778, 819 P.2d at 374.
69. Id at 786-88, 819 P.2d at 377-79.
70. Id. at 785, 819 P.2d at 377.
71. Id. at 780, 819 P.2d at 374-75 ("[J]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and
without unnecessary delay.") (citing WAsH. CONST. art. I, § 10).
72. Id at 782-83, 819 P.2d at 376.
73. Id at 783, 819 P.2d at 376.
74. Id
75. Id.
76. Id. at 783-84, 819 P.2d at 376. The blood bank asserted that donor identification could
affect the donor's relationships, employment and ability to obtain insurance, credit and housing.
Id. at 784, 819 P.2d at 376.
77. Id. at 783, 819 P.2d at 376.
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ests of a dead donor or a dead donor's family, the court declined to
address those possible interests.7 8
The blood bank also argued that the public interest in maintaining
an adequate blood supply should bar disclosure of a donor's identity.
The blood bank claimed that allowing donor discovery would affect
the national blood supply.7 9 The blood bank asserted that the overly
inclusive measures used to screen for AIDS had already reduced the
donor base.80 Moreover, the threat of disclosure would cause some
donors to give incorrect information when donating."1 The blood
bank maintained that the public's interest in an adequate blood supply
outweighed the plaintiff's need for discovery.8 2
The court initiated its examination of the blood bank's policy arguments by discussing some of the difficulties with judicial decisions
based on public policy. The court noted that while public policy is an
appropriate basis for decisions, courts too often rely on policy considerations without identifying or discussing the sources they used to
reach their conclusions.8 3 Instead, judges base their policy decisions
on unsupported assertions or on their appreciation of human nature.8 4
The Doe court then went on to examine the materials submitted by the
blood bank in support of its policy claims.
The court found four problems with the information the blood bank
provided. First, the court noted that the blood bank had not offered
much of the material at the trial court level.8 " Second, there were no
specific facts in the record to support the matters that the Puget Sound
Blood Center and various amici curiae asserted. 6 Third, the court
noted that some of the material submitted would only be admissible as
expert testimony, but there was no qualification of the experts other
than by title.8 7 Finally, the blood bank only offered one affidavit at
trial, the affidavit of the executive director of the Puget Center Blood
78. Id. at 785, 819 P.2d at 377. In contrast to the interests of a living donor, the potential

interests of a dead donor include the right of privacy in one's postdeath reputation and the
family's privacy interest in the affairs of the decedent. Id. at 784, 819 P.2d at 376.
79. Id. at 786, 819 P.2d at 377.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 785, 819 P.2d at 377.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id at 786, 819 P.2d at 377.
86. Id. at 786, 819 P.2d at 377-78. For example, amicus Washington State Medical
Association asserted as a fact the percentage of decline in donations due to the AIDS problem
without providing support in the record for this claim. Id.
87. Id. at 786, 819 P.2d at 378.
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Center."8 His affidavit had two flaws: part of it was conclusory with
no factual support and part was inadmissible.8 9 The court ended by
stating that the predictions of the blood bank and its amici were little
more than speculation.90
In upholding the discovery order, the court did not consider the
donor's interests. Likewise, the court discounted the blood bank's
public policy claims regarding the effect of donor discovery on the
blood supply. In balancing the interests of the three parties, the court
accorded full weight only to the plaintiff's interests.
II. THE DOE COURT SHOULD HAVE ESTABLISHED A
DISCOVERY RULE TO PROTECT DONOR
CONFIDENTIALITY
A.

The Doe Court Should Have Fully Examined the Competing
InterestsAnd Decided the Case on Its Merits

The Washington Supreme Court should have decided the Doe case
on the merits because of the important issues presented. 9 1 The court
could have considered the interests of the blood bank and donor
despite the inadequacies in the briefs and the factual record.92 Instead,
the court has left both trial courts and blood banks without any guidance on the permissible limits of blood donor discovery.
1.

The Court Should Not Have Circumvented the Substantive Issues
Because of Inadequaciesin the FactualRecord and
Briefs

The Doe court should have fully addressed the donor's privacy
interests and the blood bank's public policy claims. No absolute procedural rule would have prohibited the court from inquiring further
into the substantive matters and resolving the problem of blood donor
discovery. Contrary to its assertion, the Doe court could have analyzed the donor's privacy interests despite inadequacies with the briefs.
The Washington Supreme Court has addressed matters not fully
88. Id.
89. Id. For example, the affadavit stated that an "abrogation" of confidentiality would
violate donor's privacy rights. Id. at 787, 819 P.2d at 378. The court found that this was an
inadmissible legal conclusion. Id.
90. Id. at 788, 819 P.2d at 379.
91. The court itself recognizes the importance of a decision in this area of the law: "We
understand the desire of Blood Center and amici to obtain a precedential ruling on the privacy
issue." Id. at 785, 819 P.2d at 377.
92. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
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briefed by the parties in other circumstances.9 3 In fact, the court on
its own has raised issues that determine the outcome of a case. 94
In addition, the court could have addressed the potential effects of
blood donor discovery on the nation's blood supply, even if all the
experts were not qualified and even if the facts the experts relied on
were not in the record. In other cases, the court has offered guidance
on issues where the evidentiary record was too incomplete for the
court to make a final decision.95 At the very least, the Doe court
should have discussed the importance of the public policy considerations involved vis-a-vis the plaintiff's interests in discovery. The court
could have then remanded the case for further proceedings after
proper development of the factual record, including qualification of
the experts. The court's discussion of the policy considerations would
have served to guide the trial court on remand.
2.

The Court Should Have Given Guidance to the Trial Courts and
Blood Banks

The court's decision is problematic because it fails to provide trial
courts with a clear rule for blood donor discovery. As it stands, trial
judges may use their discretion to craft a discovery order which protects the donor's identity. 96 Trial judges also have the authority to
compel disclosure of donor identity. 97 It may also be within the discretion of the trial court to prohibit discovery of the donor altogether,
as the Washington Supreme Court has not yet ruled otherwise. The
Washington Supreme Court's grant of broad discretion to trial courts
creates a danger of inconsistent discovery orders. The important
issues of privacy and protection of the blood supply currently rest on
the beliefs of the individual judge and the persuasive skills of counsel
93. See, eg., Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 983 (1973). Siegler involved a young woman who died in a gasoline explosion caused by gas
spilled from an overturned tanker truck. Id at 449, 502 P.2d at 1182. On appeal, the claim of
error was the refusal of the trial court to give an instruction of res ipsa loquitor. Id. at 453, 502
P.2d at 1184. The Washington Supreme Court sua sponte raised the claim of strict liability and
then proceeded to hold defendant strictly liable. Id.

94. Id.
95. See, eg., City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wash. 2d 171, 795 P.2d 693 (1990). In
Douglass, the court discussed at length the constitutionally based challenge of an ordinance. Id.
at 178-83, 795 P.2d at 696-99. The court did not have an adequate factual record to actually
rule on whether the ordinance was vague as applied to the defendant. Id. at 183, 795 P.2d at 699.
Despite this, the court still provided an analysis of vagueness challenges before remanding for
further proceedings. Id. at 178-83, 795 P.2d at 696-99.
96. Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 117 Wash. 2d 619, 629, 818 P.2d 1056,
1061 (1991).
97. Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 117 Wash. 2d 772, 776-77, 819 P.2d 370, 373 (1991).
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in a particular case. The Washington Supreme Court has left the issue
vulnerable to trial court discretion rather than offering a definite
answer to the sensitive problem of donor discovery.
The Washington Supreme Court has also failed to provide blood
banks with any certainty regarding the discovery of donor identity.
Previously, blood banks in Washington promised confidentiality to
donors. 98 After Doe, blood banks will not be able to give this guarantee. All they can tell blood donors is that a trial judge may99 or may
not"°° order disclosure of identifying information in the event of litigation. Blood banks are now unable to promise that highly personal
information, including test results, will remain confidential or anonymous. This will dampen the willingness of many potential donors to
reveal information and submit to testing.10 1
Instead of skirting the substantive issues, the Doe court should have
clarified this area of the law by deciding the case on its merits. A
precedential ruling would have brought certainty to this area of discovery. Blood banks would have received clear guidelines upon which
to base promises of confidentiality, and the serious issue of blood
donor discovery would not depend on the discretion of individual
judges in each case.
B.

The CourtShould Have Found that the Trial Court Abused Its
Discretion

The Doe court should have held that an order allowing discovery of
identifying information constituted an abuse of discretion. Courts
should not order blood banks to reveal the identities of blood donors
during discovery. The plaintiff's need for identifying information
about the donor is minimal when compared to the donor's interest in
privacy. Disclosure of HIV status can have devastating effects. 10 2
Furthermore, blood banks and the public have a strong interest in
maintaining an adequate blood supply. 103
98. Confidentiality is the practice of the American Red Cross, the Council of Community
Blood Centers and the American Association of Blood Banks. Petitioner's Brief at 25, Doe v.
Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 117 Wash. 2d 772, 819 P.2d 370 (1991) (No. 56236-9).
99. Doe, 117 Wash. 2d at 789, 819 P.2d at 379 (upholding order compelling disclosure of
donor identity).
100. Howell, 117 Wash. 2d at 630, 818 P.2d at 1062 (upholding order providing for the
confidentiality of the blood donor).
101. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
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L

The Donor'sIdentity Is Not Useful to the Plaintiff

The Doe court overstated the benefit to the plaintiff of allowing discovery of the donor's identity. The court noted that access to the
court system is guaranteed under the Washington State Constitution."° However, the court did not explain how disclosure of the
donor's identity would improve access to the court system. The plaintiff argued that the identity of the donor was necessary to investigate
whether thorough screening had occurred and to pursue his claims
against the blood bank.10 5 The court did not indicate how having the
donor's name would allow the plaintiff to investigate the thoroughness
of the screening.
If discovery is allowed, the name of the donor should not affect the
plaintiff's case. A plaintiff's request for the identity of a blood donor
may represent only the desire to obtain access to the donor for questioning, rather than a belief that the name itself provides any independently valuable information.10 6 The true identity of the donor is
unimportant because a plaintiff may use interrogatories or a veiled
deposition to obtain information regarding a donor's medical history,
personal life and the blood bank screening process. This was the
essence of the Washington Supreme Court's holding in Howell. The
court found that plaintiff Howell did not demonstrate what relevant
evidence he might discover by knowing the donor's true identity."0 7
The court denied the plaintiff's request for access to the donor's name
because the plaintiff could show no prejudice from the discovery order
protecting the donor's identity.10 8
Given that the donor in Doe had already died, the plaintiff had even
less reason to discover his or her identity. The plaintiff could have
obtained information regarding the donor's death, or cause of death,
but the parties already had those facts.10 9 There was no material issue
regarding the donor's death from AIDS or the plaintiff's infection
from the donor's blood.' 10 The trial court ordered the blood bank to
provide plaintiff with the donor's address as of the time of donation. 1 '
104. Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 117 Wash. 2d 772, 780, 819 P.2d 370, 374-75 (1991).
105. Id. at 775, 819 P.2d at 372 (citing to Brief of Respondent at 4, 35).
106. See, eg., Sampson v. American Nat'l Red Cross, No. CA3-90-2876-T, 1991 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 17285, at *11-12 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 1991) (plaintiff's request for donor's identity for sole
purpose of deposing donor himself).
107. Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 117 Wash. 2d 619, 629, 818 P.2d
1056, 1061 (1991).
108. Id.
109. Doe, 117 Wash. 2d at 775, 819 P.2d at 372.
110. Id.
111. Id.at 776, 819 P.2d at 372.
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However, it is unlikely anyone living at that address could provide
useful information about the blood bank's screening of the deceased
donor.

2. Disclosure of Blood DonorIdentity SubstantiallyBurdens the
Donor's Privacy Interests
The Doe court should have established a discovery rule protecting
the privacy interests of blood donors. The type of questions plaintiffs
in AIDS litigation ask of donors typically involves highly personal

information. 1 2 Because AIDS is contracted primarily through intravenous drug use or homosexual activity,1 13 the questions regarding a
donor's lifestyle could touch upon very intimate and perhaps damaging information." 4 Answering these questions during discovery will
be far less intrusive of the donor's privacy if they can be answered

anonymously. Additionally, donors may be more honest in their
answers if they know their identities will not be revealed. Therefore, it
will benefit both the plaintiff and the donor to protect the donor's

confidentiality.
Furthermore, donors have strong privacy interests in avoiding association of their names with HIV-positive status. AIDS carriers have
been subjected to a wide variety of discrimination.11 5 School boards
116
have acted to ban students with AIDS or HIV from the classroom.
HIV-positive individuals have difficulty obtaining medical and dental
care." 7 They also suffer from general isolation and stigmatization. 118
112. See ag., Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 651 (D.S.C. 1989).
113. Ortiz & Aaberg, supra note 12, at 336-37.
114. See Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 117 Wash. 2d 619, 628, 818 P.2d
1056, 1061 (1991) ("Donor... has a significant interest in avoiding intrusion into his private life.
Because the HIV virus is known to be transmitted through sexual cortact, intravenous drug use,
and blood transfusion, [plaintiff] would undoubtedly wish to ask highly personal questions of
[donor's] relatives, friends, co-workers, and others.").
115. The largest area of AIDS litigation has involved discriminztion issues. Gostin, supra
note 15, at 1961.
116. See, eg., Board of Educ. of Plainfield v. Cooperman, 523 A.2d 655, 657 (N.J. 1987)
(involving the policy of two school boards to exclude HIV-positive students from attending
classes).
117. See, eg., Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass. 1991) (discrimination suit
against doctor and hosptial for refusing to perform surgery on HIV-infected plaintiff); Doe v.
Kahala Dental Group, 808 P.2d 1276 (Haw. 1991) (discrimination suit against a dentist for
refusing to treat HIV-infected patient).
118. See, e.g., Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (involving an
HIV-positive inmate confined to an area reserved for mentally disturbed or suicidal inmates);
Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376 (N.J. 1990) (in whi-h eleven parents removed
their children from a school when they found out the father of one of the other students had
AIDS); Jasperson v. Jessica's Nail Clinic, 216 Cal. App. 3d. 1099 (1989) (HIV-infected customer
denied a pedicure).
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On top of all this, those with AIDS or HIV infection face the possibility of termination from their employment, and with this, the loss of
precious medical benefits. 19 Given the danger that disclosure of HIV
status may pose to a donor's personal life, the Doe court should have
established a rule guaranteeing privacy for blood donors.
3.

Disclosure of Donor Identities Could Adversely Affect the
Nation's Blood Supply

Unlimited discovery of blood donors may dangerously reduce the
nation's blood supply. 12 0 All potential blood donors must agree to
have their blood tested for HIV. Currently, blood banks promise that
test results will remain confidential.1 2 Without this promise of confi122
dentiality, many donors may choose not to submit to these tests.
Informing potential donors that their test results, along with their
identities, will be available to litigants may deter them from donating.
The combined fears of becoming embroiled in litigation, facing disclosure of positive test results, and being asked questions regarding one's
private life will dampen the charitable disposition of many toward

donating blood. 123
The improvements in blood testing for HIV do not render concerns
about entanglement in future litigation obsolete. Even with the current screening tests, the possibility of contaminated blood and subsequent litigation still remains. Blood banks use the ELISA and
Western blot tests to test for the HIV antibody. 2 However, there is a
window period of four to sixteen weeks between exposure to the virus
and the development of antibodies.1 25 During that window period,
119. See, ag., Raytheon Co. v. California Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 212 Cal.
App. 3d 1242 (1989) (involving an employee discharged because he had been diagnosed with
AIDS); Petri v. Bank of New York Co., No. 12357/91, 1992 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 71 (N.Y. Feb.

11, 1992) (involving wrongful termination claim by homosexual loan officer who was perceived
as potentially HIV-positive); Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d 814 (W. Va.

1990) (claim for wrongful termination by HIV-infected pest control inspector).
120. Many courts have held that the public policy of maintaining an adequate blood supply
outweighs the plaintiff's interests in litigation. See, eg., Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130
F.R.D. 360, 363 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (societal interest in an adequate and safe blood supply
outweighs the plaintiff's discovery needs); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d
533, 538 (Fla. 1987) (denial of donor discovery furthers society's interest in a strong and healthy
blood supply).
121. Petitioner's Brief at 25, Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 117 Wash. 2d 772, 819 P.2d 370
(1991) (No. 56236-9).
122. See Gostin, supra note 15, at 1962.
123. Id.; see also Coleman, 130 F.R.D. at 362 (specter of litigation and potential for probing
questions would serve to dampen interest in donating blood).
124. Schwartz et al., supra note 7, at 2578.
125. Hjelle & Busch, supra note 7, at 975.
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one can be infected with HIV and still test negative. There can even
be periods
of seronegativity 126 after an initial period of seropositivity. 127 Furthermore, researchers have discovered a new class of HIV
virus, the HIV-2 virus.12 While there are no reports of infection with
HIV-2 in United States, it has spread from West Africa to Western
Europe. 12 9 Current tests for HIV-1 will not detect the HIV-2 virus.13 0
Thus, it is still possible that the blood supply will be tainted with HIVinfected blood. The added risk of human error in managing the testing, including mishandling of blood samples"' and error in evaluating
test results, 132 further enhances that possibility.
Some argue that discovery of blood donors actually will further the
blood banks' interest in a clean blood supply. 13 The argument
assumes that disclosure of blood donor identities, along with HIV-positive test results, will serve to discourage those who know they are at
risk of AIDS from donating blood in the first place.13 4 The fear of
disclosure will assist in the process of self-screening. Conversely, those
who know that they are HIv-negative will not be deterred from donating because they face no risk of becoming embroiled in AIDS litigation.13 5 The argument concludes that the deterrence of high-risk
donors through the threat of disclosure is desirable because it facilitates a clean blood supply.
However, this pro-discovery argument is unsound. Many people
may be HIV-positive without knowing it. Even someone in a longterm marriage who avoids any risky practices may become HIV-positive due to a one-time indiscretion by an unfaithful spouse. 136 Moreover, the population is not made up of uncaring, negligent people who
donate blood despite the knowledge that they are high-risk or HIVpositive, and caring, generous people who know they are not HIVpositive. Many people believe that they are HIV-negative but know
that certainty is impossible without a blood test. The knowledge that
126. Seronegativity refers to blood which tests negative for the HIV antibody.
127. Ortiz & Aaberg, supra note 12, at 337.
128. Report of the Workgroup on Blood and Blood Products, supra note 13, at 59.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 58.
132. Schwartz et al., supra note 7, at 2575.
133. See, e.g., Robert K. Jenner, Identifying HIV-Infected Blood Donors, TRIAL, June 1989,
47, 50.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Thomas A. Peterman et al., Risk ofHuman Immunodeficiency Virus Transmissionfrom
HeterosexualAdults with Transfusion-AssociatedInfections, 259 JAMA 55, 56 (1988).

996

Protecting Donor Privacy
positive test results could be disclosed in potential litigation may deter
those people from donating blood.
The Doe court erred in failing to make a precedential ruling protecting the identities of blood donors in AIDS litigation. The privacy
interests of blood donors are far greater than the interests of plaintiffs
in obtaining the identity of donors. Blood banks need to be able to
promise confidentiality to blood donors because they may not be willing to donate without this guarantee. The nation's blood supply
depends on volunteer donors. It is important that the public remain
willing to donate blood and undergo the required HIV testing.1 37
III. PROTECTING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF BLOOD
DONORS IN AIDS LITIGATION: A LEGISLATIVE
SOLUTION
Legislative action is needed because the Washington Supreme Court
has not provided the necessary protection for blood donors. The legislature should enact a statute that ensures both an adequate blood supply and confidentiality for blood donors. The existing Washington

statute limiting disclosure of HIV test results does not provide ade-

quate protection for blood donors. 138 There are three major problems
with this statute in terms of blood bank testing of donors. First, it is
unclear whether this statute covers tests that blood banks conduct.
The statute refers to the individual tested as a "patient" and further
refers to the "physician-patient" relationship.1 39 Blood donors may
137. AIDS has already reduced the national blood supply. In 1986, a poll by the American
Association of Blood Banks found that 34% of those surveyed believed donating blood could
result in AIDS infection. Holland, Blood Policy Dynamic An Overview, in AIDS: PUBLIC
POLICY DIMENSIONS 101, 104 (J. Griggs ed., 1987), cited in Maria S. Kirsch, Note, AIDS:
Anonymity in Donation Situations-Where Public Benefit Meets Private Good, 69 B.U. L. REV.
187, 205 (1989); see also Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 537-38 (Fla.
1987) ("The donor population has been reduced by the necessary exclusion of potential blood
donors through AIDS screening and testing procedures as well as by the unnecessary reduction
in the donor population as a result of the widespread fear that donation itself can transmit the
disease.").
138. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.105(2) (West Supp. 1992) provides that "[no] person
may disclose or be compelled to disclose the identity of any person upon whom an HIV antibody
test is performed, or the results of such a test, nor may the result of a test for any other sexually
transmitted disease when it is positive be disclosed." The statute allows disclosure of test results
and identity in a number of circumstances, one of which is by judicial order for good cause
shown. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.105(2)(f) (West Supp. 1992) permits disclosure to "[a]
person allowed access to the record by a court order granted after application showing good
cause therefor. In assessing good cause, the court shall weigh the public interest and the need for
disclosure against the injury to the patient, to the physician-patient relationship, and to the
treatment services."
139. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.24.105(2)(f) (West Supp. 1992).
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not be "patients" within the meaning of the statute. Second, the statute is not sufficiently explicit regarding the circumstances under which
a court may order disclosure. In considering whether an order compelling disclosure is appropriate, the court weighs the necessity for disclosure, the
interests of the public, and the interests of the
"patient." 1" This test leaves the issue of disclosure as discretionary as
the discovery rules do. Third, the statute is problematic in that it does
not provide for the complete privacy of donor identity. The statute
permits both the identity of the donor and the test results to be
released upon a showing of good cause. 141 However, in the context of
blood bank litigation the identity of a blood donor should never be
disclosed, as litigants do not need to know the donor's true name. 142
A statute directed at blood bank HIV testing is needed. The statute
should guarantee absolute anonymity for blood donors. If a plaintiff
can show good cause, however, courts should permit interrogatories of
the donor. The statute should require that the plaintiff demonstrate
the necessity of each question he or she wishes to ask the donor. To
protect the privacy of the donor, the interrogatories should be channeled through the court or given to the blood bank to pass on to the
donor. If, after the initial round of interrogatories, the plaintiff can
demonstrate both the need to depose the donor and that further interrogatories would not provide sufficient information, the court should
allow a veiled deposition of the donor. Courts should not allow depositions without this further showing of need because depositions pose a
greater danger of infringement on donor privacy.
The statute could read as follows:
(1) No blood collection agency may disclose or be compelled to
disclose either the identity of a person upon whom an HIV test is
performed or the results of such a test, except as to those persons
to whom the information may be disclosed as provided in RCW
70.24.105(2),141 provided that RCW 70.24.105(2)(t) 1" shall not be
applicable to this section.

140. Id
141. Id.
142. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.

143. See supra note 138 for text of WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. 70.24.105(2) (West Supp. 1992)
(prohibiting disclosure of HIV test results except to those persons specified in the statute).
144. See supra note 138 for text of WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 70.24.105(2)(f) (West Supp.
1992) (allowing the court to order disclosure of test results and the identity of the person
undergoing the testing).
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(2) Blood donors may be compelled by court order, for good cause
shown, to comply with discovery requests of litigants, provided that
confidentiality shall be maintained.
(3) Discovery requests covered by this provision shall initially be
limited to the submission of interrogatories. The Parties seeking discovery shall bear the burden of demonstrating to the court the relevance of each interrogatory to their case.
(4) Interrogatories covered by subsection (3) shall be submitted to
the clerk of the court or to the blood collection agency for submission
to the donor.
(5) After completion of the initial round of interrogatories, a court
may, at its discretion, permit litigants to conduct a veiled deposition of
the donor provided that litigants demonstrate a specific need to depose
the donor and that further interrogatories would not be likely to provide the information the plaintiff seeks.
(6) Donors shall not be required to respond to questions which
would reveal identifying information.
Legislation protecting blood donors would advance the public's
interest in an adequate blood supply and donors' interests in confidential HIV testing of donated blood. The current statute does not adequately protect either the blood supply or donors' privacy.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Given the importance of confidentiality for HIV testing, courts
should prohibit disclosure of identifying information in blood bank litigation. Plaintiffs have a minimal interest in the identities of blood
donors. On the other hand, blood donors have a strong interest in
maintaining confidentiality because identification as an AIDS carrier
can cause enormous damage to a person's life. Without adequate
guarantees of anonymity, many potential donors will refrain from giving blood at all. AIDS has already taken its toll on the nation's blood
supply. Legislation is needed to ensure that inadequate protection of
blood donors does not further deplete the blood supply.
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